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Divine Simplicity 2 - Of God and the Holy Trinity (2LCF 2.1-3)

Cameron Porter · 2014-09-14 · 7,562 words · 52 min

1689 London Baptist Confession

Chapter 2 in the Second London 
Baptist Confession of Faith. I'm going to read paragraphs 
1 and 2 this time and we'll continue our look at the doctrine of divine 
simplicity. We'll spend just a few moments 
reacquainting ourselves with the doctrine and that sort of 
thing. A small review of what we covered 
last time and then continue to completion this morning with 
the doctrine of divine simplicity. So this is Chapter 2, paragraphs 
1 and 2. The Lord our God is but one only 
living and true God, whose subsistence is in and of himself, infinite 
in being and perfection, whose essence cannot be comprehended 
by any but himself, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, 
parts, or passions, who only hath immortality, dwelling in 
the light which no man can approach unto, who is immutable, immense, 
eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, every way infinite, most holy, 
most wise, most free, most absolute, working all things according 
to the counsel of his own immutable and most righteous will for his 
own glory, most loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant 
in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and 
sin, the rewarder of them that diligently seek him and with 
all most just and terrible in his judgments, hating all sin 
and who will by no means clear the guilty. God, having all life, 
glory, goodness, blessedness in and of himself, is alone in 
and unto himself all-sufficient, not standing in need of any creature 
which he hath made, nor deriving any glory from them, but only 
manifesting his own glory in, by, unto, and upon them. He is 
the alone fountain of all being, of whom, through whom, and to 
whom are all things, and he hath most sovereign dominion over 
all creatures, to do by them, for them, or upon them, whatsoever 
himself pleaseth. In his sight all things are open 
and manifest. His knowledge is infinite, infallible, 
and independent upon the creature, so as nothing is to him contingent 
or uncertain. He is most holy in all his counsels, 
in all his works, and in all his commands. To him is due from 
angels and men whatsoever worship, service, or obedience as creatures 
they owe unto their Creator, unto the Creator, and whatever 
he is further pleased to require of them." So last time we looked, 
or we started to look, at the doctrine of divine simplicity, 
and we'll reacquaint ourselves in a moment, but it's always 
good Or it can be good sometimes to start a study of theology 
proper with a quote from Spurgeon who has written Nothing will 
so enlarge the intellect, nothing so magnify the whole soul of 
man as a devout, earnest, continued investigation of the great subject 
of the deity. The most excellent study for 
expanding the soul is the science of Christ and Him crucified and 
the knowledge of the Godhead in the glorious Trinity. The 
enterprise, if you will, of theology proper is a noble and a good 
one because we are studying the One who is the Creator, the Sustainer, 
and the Redeemer of men. So last time we started to look 
at the doctrine of divine simplicity, and we noted that the doctrine 
of divine simplicity is seen in the statement where we read 
in paragraph one, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, 
parts, or passions, and specifically without parts. That is where 
we find the doctrine of divine simplicity represented in the 
language of the confession. How is it that God, or how can 
we, you know, with real meaning say that God is a pure spirit? Well, by the fact that he is 
invisible, by the fact that he is incorporeal or immaterial, 
that is, without body. by the fact that he is incomplex 
or uncompounded or simple, that is, he is without parts, and 
then that he is impassable or without passions. We noted last 
time that this idea of God without parts, this truth of God without 
parts, or the doctrine of divine simplicity, is the ontological 
explanation, that is, the doctrine of being reason for God's, the 
fact that he is in and of himself, the fact that he is immutable, 
the fact that he is absolute in all of these ways, first off, 
generally most absolute, and that he is most holy, most wise, 
most free, etc. In other words, this doctrine 
of divine simplicity is the ontological foundation for, the doctrine 
of being, explanation for all of these perfections that we 
see the confession opening up here. We noted that The doctrine 
is foundationally behind the statements, whose subsistence 
is in and of himself, infinite in being and perfection, every 
way infinite, most holy, most wise, most free, most absolute, 
most loving, etc. God having all life, glory, goodness, 
blessedness in and of himself is alone, in and unto himself 
all sufficient, not standing in need of any creature which 
he hath made. nor deriving any glory from them." 
The reason the Confession can say that is because God is without 
parts. The doctrine is present in all 
the Reformed creeds. It appeared first in the 39 articles 
of the Anglican Church and was present in the Belgic Confession 
in different language than without parts. It just simply said that 
God is a simple being, which is maybe even more to the point 
rather than defining what it means in itself. We noted or 
we defined what the doctrine of divine simplicity means. When 
we say simplicity, what do we mean? If you weren't here last 
time, this is what we said. We said, first off, it does not 
mean that God is comprehensible. In other words, divine simplicity 
means that we can fully grasp within our minds God to full 
exhaustion. We can know him. Completely, 
we can know him in his very essence and we can know as the, well, 
to get to the point, the confession excludes that as a reality when 
it says. whose essence cannot be comprehended 
by any but himself. So when we say divine simplicity, 
we are not railing against incomprehensibility, that is that God in his being 
and essence is beyond our full comprehension. We can know him. 
He has revealed himself to us, but we cannot fully contain God 
within the grasp of our knowledge. When we say divine simplicity, 
we do not mean that his essence is easy to grasp or that God 
is ordinary or unadorned. When we say God is simple, we're 
certainly not bringing him down to a position whereby we're saying 
he is ordinary, unadorned, or not the object of praise and 
worship. And we're definitely not saying that God is ignorant 
or dumb or gullible. that is not what divine simplicity 
means. It does mean then, and we gave 
two definitions provided by James Dolezal, it does mean for one 
definition, well, let's just go to the confessional definition 
without parts, but to open that up, divine simplicity is articulated 
apophatically, again that means by negative language, is articulated 
apophatically as God's lack of parts and denies that he is physically, 
logically, or metaphysically composite. Secondly, the classical 
doctrine of simplicity holds forth the maxim that there is 
nothing in God that is not God. So, there is nothing in God that 
is not God. noted or we talked about the 
fact that that means that he is not the sum of his attributes. 
God is not a compounded being whereby he is composed of parts. And what would we define as a 
part? A part is anything in a subject, 
in this case God, a part is anything in a subject that is less than 
the whole and that without that part the subject would be less 
than it is. So we do not say with regards 
to God that he is composed of attributes, that he is the composite 
of love, mercy, justice, goodness, truth, et cetera. But rather, 
all of those things are God. God is all of those things that 
are predicated of him. God is light. God is love, et 
cetera. The historical witness to the 
doctrine of divine simplicity, we're working our way to the 
beginning of our coverage this morning, just reviewing the things 
that we looked at last time. The historical witness to the 
doctrine of divine simplicity, we noted Muller saying, the doctrine 
of divine simplicity is among the normative assumptions of 
theology from the time of the church fathers to the age of 
the great medieval scholastic systems to the era of Reformation 
and post-Reformation theology and indeed on into the succeeding 
era of late orthodoxy and rationalism. So it's not like this doctrine 
sprung up and was manufactured by men to explain God at some 
time in history. It didn't arise with the reformers. It didn't arise with the medieval 
scholastics. It didn't arise in the 20th century 
or the 19th, but rather it is a biblical doctrine. that has 
been the normative assumption of theology since the time of 
the early church. We noted Irenaeus, Gregory of 
Nysa, the Nicene Fathers, Augustine, all speak to this, and it's very 
significantly behind the affirmations of the early church in maintaining 
the full deity of the sun and the doctrine of the Trinity. 
We noted the medieval scholars, Bothius and Psalm, but most notably 
Thomas Aquinas, Reformed quotes that we brought out, William 
Perkins, Melanchthon, Calvin, John Owen, Francis Turretin, 
who said, the Orthodox have constantly taught that the essence of God 
is perfectly simple and free from all composition. And we 
quoted our Baptist forefather, if you will, John Gill. We also 
noted the 19th and 20th century theologians, Spurgeon, Bovinck, 
Burkoff, and in our present day, in our present tradition, besides 
many men who hold to the doctrine, we have one young fellow, James 
Dolezal, who wrote his doctrinal dissertation that was published 
on this very subject, maintaining the truth of God without parts. So then we opened up the doctrine 
of divine simplicity, and we said that God is without parts 
would certainly include that he is without physical parts, 
but that is subsumed under without body. While the truth that God 
is without parts includes physical parts, It has more to do with, 
in fact, everything to do with the denial that God has any composition 
whatsoever. He is not composed of physical 
parts, to be sure, but he's not composed of metaphysical parts 
or, we might say, logical parts. The central claim, writes Dolezal, 
is that God is what he is in virtue of his Godhead and not 
by virtue of properties in hearing in him. He is not a composition 
of parts that dwell inside of him, if you will. That means, 
or what are we excluding from parts while God is not composed 
of form and matter? God is not composed of both existence 
and being, or sorry, essence and existence, or essence and 
being. Remember, we noted that essence is the whatness of a 
thing, what is a thing, what is God, and the being or existence 
of a thing is the principle by which that thing is anything 
at all. In God, they must be identical 
because there is no cause of God. The first cause, he is in 
and of himself all-sufficient. There is no mover before God. 
He is the sole mover. But whereas in people, our essence 
and our being are different because we derive the principle by which 
we are from God. And so God is not composed of 
form and matter. He's not composed of essence 
and being. He's not composed of intellect, will, and heart, 
and or emotion. Remember, we noted that faculty 
psychology comes around in the late 1800s and introduces this 
compartmental approach to psychology. And oftentimes that trickles 
its way into theology and we say that God has a will, whereas 
it's distinguished from his intellect. So God has an intellect, he has 
a will, and he has, we might say, a heart or emotion. God 
is not composed of parts. We cannot properly say that God 
has a will, but we can speak in such a way because of the 
finitude of our language. And we'll look more at that in 
a moment. But remember, or keep this in mind, God is not composed 
of intellect, will, and heart or emotion. God is not composed 
of some substance and accidents. That is, there are not those 
things that make God who he is, but then some things that he 
either adds to himself or that he takes on that are not essential 
to him, but rather he is not composed of parts. And then finally, 
We wanted to spend time on two things. First off, we looked 
at God is not composed of multiple attributes. We do say that God 
is loving. We do say that God is merciful. We do say that God is just. We 
do say all of those things. But when we say those things, 
we are not saying that those are so many things that compose 
God. Remember, we had a sort of a 
chart up on the board where It's sort of common in men's understanding 
to conceive of God as having, to a maximal degree, all of the 
various attributes that are possible in a being. In men, we have them 
to certain varying portions, and we're composed of those particular 
attributes. And in God, he's just maximally 
better, or he's just the perfect, pure representation of someone 
who is composed of all these attributes. Well, we cannot conceive 
that of God because he would not then be most holy because 
there would be, if you will, constituent parts comprising 
the whole that would prevent God from being infinite in holiness 
and infinite in wisdom, etc. We noted that all that is in 
God is God. The doctrine of divine simplicity 
teaches that, and this is Dolezal again. First, God is identical 
with his existence in essence. Second, that each of his attributes 
is ontologically identical with his existence, and therefore, 
with every one of his attributes. So his love is identical to his 
justice, which is identical to his holiness, which is identical 
to all of those other things that we predicate of him. And 
then finally, we started to, but with about a minute left, 
we started to look at this. Under multiple attributes and 
that God cannot be composed of parts, we want to note the distinction 
of attributes with respect to God's revelation to us does not 
reflect some composite nature to God. That simply means what 
we've already said. When God reveals that he's loving 
and merciful and just, that doesn't indicate that he is composed 
of parts. This is Charnot. God, being desirous 
to make himself known to man whom he created for his glory, 
humbles as it were his own nature to such representations as may 
suit and assist the capacity of the creature. since by the 
condition of our nature nothing erects a notion of itself in 
our understanding, but as it is conducted in by our sense, 
God hath served himself of those things which are most exposed 
to our sense, most obvious to our understandings, to give us 
some acquaintance with his own nature, and those things which 
otherwise we were not capable of having any notion of." In 
other words, because we understand parts and composition because 
we are composed of parts and we are compound beings. God, 
in his non-composition, being uncompounded, in his infinitude 
has communicated to us in certain ways that we might understand 
him. He is the self-predicator, the 
one who explains himself and he has revealed himself in the 
scriptures under these various attributes and under these various 
properties and characteristics. But that revelation of those 
things, that does not mean that he is a sum or composition of 
all of those things, but rather just reflect his condescension 
in revealing himself in ways that we might understand. Remember 
this very important point. You see, we don't say that God 
is wise in virtue of wisdom or that God is loving in virtue 
of love, but rather that God is wise and God is loving in 
virtue of himself. If we say God is wise in virtue 
of wisdom, wisdom exists as an abstract universal alongside 
of God eternally. that he predicates of himself, 
or that he adds to himself, or that he participates in, to a 
maximal degree, along with men who only participate in perhaps 
a small degree. The same with love. But if we 
say that, then we're saying that there is something back of God 
that serves as the explanation for God, and then therefore he 
is not the first cause, but rather something The things that he 
is composed of would then be the explanation for his very 
existence, and we must deny that of God. We noted, or actually maybe just 
to close this section so that we can move on, here's John Gill, 
simplicity is not. to be disproved by the attributes 
of God, for they are no other than God himself, and neither 
differ from one another, but with respect to their objects 
and effect, and in our manner of conception of them. These 
several things called attributes, which are one in God, are predicated 
of him, and ascribed to him distinctly, for helps to our finite understandings, 
and for the relief of our minds, and that we, with more facility 
and ease, might conceive of the nature of God and take in more 
of him as we can by parcels and piecemeals than in the whole. 
And so, all those attributes are only intellectual notions 
by which are conceived the perfections that are in the essence of God, 
but in reality are nothing but his essence. Again, in about 
25 minutes, half an hour, we'll pause and stop. We'll stop for 
questions and conversation. So the next important thing to 
consider with regards to God is that he is not composed of 
act and potency. We'll explain what that means, 
because this is, though that sounds, oh, here we go with some 
more metaphysical language, very important when we talk about 
God's immutability the fact that he cannot change, and very important 
when we talk next week about divine impassibility, that God 
is without passions. You see, throughout the history 
of the Church, as we noted the historical witness to the doctrine 
of divine simplicity, they have upheld this idea that God is 
pure act, or God can only be described as having pure actuality. He cannot be characterized as 
having a passive capacity or ability or we might say an ontological 
dormancy whereby he can be acted upon or aroused to perform an 
action. God is not composed of act and 
potency and hopefully this will become clear in a moment. When 
we think about act, we think about to operate or to perform. In other words, act in contrast 
to a passive potency, which would mean something has the capacity 
to be acted upon and to be moved to actuality. So we would say 
this, in God there is not both activity and passivity. God doesn't wait to be acted 
upon either by himself or his creation or creatures, but is 
always productive in his essence. He is always active. He is always 
the agent. He is always the one operating. He is never operated upon by 
himself or by others. God is, and just a number of 
things to consider under this heading, God is pure act and 
devoid of all passive potency. Again, the ability or capacity 
of a thing to become different than it is. That's what passive 
potency means. Since the first mover is necessarily 
unmoved by another, and since all movement comes from some 
mover in act, that first mover must be pure act. We would steal 
away from God his independence, and we would steal away from 
God his immutability if we said that in God there is some passivity 
whereby he can be acted upon either by himself or by creatures 
outside of himself. Potentiality involves lack of 
perfection and requires actualization in order to be made perfect. 
So if we would conceive in God as having this principle of passive 
potency, the ability or capacity of a thing to become different 
than it is, then we would steal away as well God's perfection. Because if he could be moved 
to further acts of actuality that he did not have in some 
time prior to that, then Again, we would say that whatever 
was actualized was imperfect because it was in a state of 
potentiality. And now it has become perfect. So we could not ascribe perfection 
to God. We could not say that he is perfect 
in his holiness, wisdom, freedom, et cetera, because he would be 
moved from a position of passive potency to a position of actuality 
or to a position whereby he is operating and producing. we would 
say, or we need to say, as Klubertens writes, being in potency, that 
is, in that passive capability or capacity, is the condition 
of not really having, but being able to acquire some perfection. You see, we can never say that 
of God, can we? And this is language that perhaps 
we need to removed from our conceptions or our communications concerning 
God. God has the capacity or the faculty. We do speak about God having 
ability with regards to his omnipotence, but we cannot say that God has 
the capacity, if we mean by that, that he is passive and can be 
moved to some reality or actuality either by himself or by someone 
outside of himself. Let's just use an example here. 
God speaks in the Bible. He reveals himself in places 
such as Genesis 6-6 where we read that God was grieved in 
his heart. So if we take that and we arrive 
at then this ontological conclusion that God was at a state where 
he was not grieved, but then was moved by men, people outside 
of himself, that he's dependent upon now for these various displays 
of emotions. He was moved from having not 
grieved to having grieved. If we make that conclusion that 
God really can move from that position of passive potency, 
having not yet grieved, to this actuality of having now grieved, 
then First of all, we're saying that God is dependent upon things 
outside of himself to gain a definition of himself in his being. But 
then we're also saying that God is not perfect or that God is 
in a position whereby he can be acted upon. So he is not He 
has not yet developed this perfection of grieving, if you will, because 
he was at a position where it was only potential. Then we steal 
these, from God, these most aspects, most holy, most wise, most free. I mean, next week we'll talk 
about the reality that God cannot in any proper way grieve. He 
cannot be pained in his heart. But the idea here is to understand 
that God does not have a condition whereby he acquires certain perfections 
and things as he lives out his life, if you will. God cannot 
be determinable, incomplete, or perfectible. He cannot be 
brought to determining completion or perfection by created things 
or events. And he cannot self-determine, 
self-complete, or self-perfect, because this would mean there 
was or is lack in God, until such time as all potentiality 
is brought to actuality. We must conceive of and understand 
God as pure act. Under this as well, we must be 
careful not to confuse the effects of divine act with the act itself, 
or to say that the temporal vicissitudes of life, the ebb and flow of 
events of life, and plurality of things in reality reflect 
the present actions and interactions of God who has entered into time 
and history to affect and react. What do we mean by that? This 
is Dolezal again. When God performs an operation, 
he does not move from potential agency to actual agency, even 
if the temporal effects of his operation are moved from potential 
to actuality. An example, creation. God didn't 
move from creator to, or from not creator to creator. Creation didn't make God the 
creator. God did not even move from not 
having willed creation to now having willed creation. Because 
then there would have been this passive potency in God whereby 
he was not ontologically the same prior to creation as he 
is now after he has created. When God performs an operation, 
he does not move from potential agency to actual agency, and 
this is important, even if the temporal effects of his operation 
are moved from that to that. There was a time when the world 
and the universe were not. But the act, the eternal act, 
we would say the act of creation itself is the effect of God's 
creative will and God's being in his essence. We must distinguish 
between act between the effects of divine act and the act itself. Creation does not introduce some 
new reality or state of affairs to God. If it did, then God must 
be conceived of being composed of both act and potentiality, 
or act and potency, in that he either actualizes something in 
himself or submits to some capacity to be actualized by something 
outside of himself. Maybe this will help a little 
bit. Dolezal writes, the act by which he creates and the act 
by which he providentially brings all things to their consummation, 
even down to the minute details, is a singular, eternal, immutable 
act that he wills in himself from all eternity. So God did 
not, at one point in his life prior to creation, stand in a 
position of deliberation where he had the option either to create 
or to not create. There was no time in God's eternal 
life, if you will, where he did not will to create all things, 
the heavens and the seas. the earth and all things that 
are in them. He always existed in the state 
by which he willed creation. It is an eternal immutable act 
that he wills in himself from all eternity. He never existed 
in a state in which he didn't will that. The action by which 
he creates is his eternal divine will. The action by which he 
providentially guides creation is that same eternal divine will. The effects themselves transpire 
in time. So when we talk about God's effects, 
we are not seeing God's action as if he is rolling along with 
time and creation, acting and reacting. If that were the case, 
he would be dependent upon and in need of the creature which 
he had made and deriving glory from them. But rather we separate 
the effects of divine act with the act itself. We also would need to say with 
regards to this that, and this comes from the confession, we'll 
see this in a moment, but God as knower and God as willer. Remember when we talked about 
God's omniscience a number of Sundays ago. We defined omniscience by quoting Birkhoff, that perfection 
of God whereby He, in an entirely unique manner, knows Himself 
and all other things possible and actual in one eternal and 
most simple act. And we noted that God's knowledge 
is not dependent upon His creation. In fact, we see here in the confession, 
in his sight, all things are open and manifest. His knowledge 
is infinite, infallible, and independent upon the creature. So, when we talk about divine 
simplicity, we must immediately confess that there is no real 
distinction in God between knower, knowing, and things known. In other words, just like we 
say God is identical to his love and God is not composed of love, 
mercy, justice, but rather he is identical with all of those 
things, so is God both identical to himself as knower, he is identical 
to the process of knowing or his productive knowing, and he 
is also identical with the things that he knows. If he was not, 
then he would be a contingent being, or he would be, as the 
Confession says, though we would use it negatively, dependent 
upon the creature. So when we say God is identical 
with the things known, we are saying exactly that. Not that 
God is identical to you, to trees, to water, and those sorts of 
things, but that God knows all things in virtue or by virtue 
of himself being God. The people would say, or the 
theologians would say, as we noted, the historical witness 
to this doctrine, they would say that God knows all things 
by knowing that his essence can be imaged forth in non-divine 
things. What are we saying and how do 
we word this simply? Let's just say that God's knowledge 
is such that he depends upon or that he must know individual 
creatures. If we say that, then again, we're 
stealing away from the, or let's just say this way, God's knowledge 
is dependent upon himself knowing and looking through the tunnels 
of time, seeing what each and every person or seeing each and 
every created person, seeing everything that those people 
will do and that sort of a thing. If we say that God's knowledge 
is such that he acquires it by his pre-creation foreknowledge 
of all things, then again we're saying that God's knowledge is 
dependent upon those created things in order for his knowledge 
to be complete. In other words, God moves from 
at one point, having not known Howie, to now having known Howie. Or God moves from having known 
Howie, but not yet having known Fraser. And then he moves from 
now having known both Howie and Fraser by this process of acquiring 
knowledge perfectly. If that's the case, then God 
is dependent upon the creature. God is not in and of himself, 
alone in and unto himself, all sufficient, but rather he does 
stand in need of creatures which he hath made in order to have 
a complete knowledge. And so in recognizing divine 
simplicity and the difference of God's knowledge as compared 
to man's knowledge, we confess that God, in God, there is no 
real distinction between knower, knowing, and things known. Remember that God's knowledge 
is not only different in what he knows. For example, God's 
knowledge is not just that he knows more than men do. He knows 
quantitatively more than man. We know some things, but God 
knows all things, and that's the difference between God's 
knowledge and us. No, it is much more infinite 
and much more wholly other and removed from our knowledge. Not 
only the what God knows, but the way in which God knows those 
things is entirely different. And the perfection of God's knowledge 
is such that he knows through the media, if you will, of his 
own essence. Because if he did not know that 
way, but rather by knowing each and every individual truth and 
person and that sort of a thing, then not only would he then be 
composed of parts, but also the imperfection of his finite creation 
would be the media, if you will, of his knowledge. If he knows 
that the best way for God to know a thing is in and of himself, 
if he is the fount of all knowledge, if he is the first mover and 
the first cause, then he knows in virtue of knowing himself. 
all things that can be imaged forth into non-divine things. If you have any clarifying questions, 
please ask them in 10 minutes time and we'll talk about these. If anything arises out of this 
discussion, hopefully you'll see as we close off that it is 
this, that this protects the doctrine of God from the minimizing 
of his absoluteness, his immutability, his eternality, his unity, that 
is, that he is the only God, the only living and true God, 
and it protects his independence. So not only is God, or not only 
since God is simple, Can there be no distinction between knower, 
knowing, and thing known, things known? We must say that there 
can be no real distinction between the one willing, the act of willing, 
and things willed. If the end of God is his own 
blessedness and glory, then there is no difference between things 
willed and God himself. Remember, we cannot separate 
or we cannot divide God into intellect and the faculty of 
willing and we could say the faculty of emotion. God cannot 
be composed of a will by which is actualized, we could say, 
by his intellect. God does not stand at a position 
of passivity whereby at some point he, with his mind and his 
intellect, actualizes his will to perform. And then there's 
a period of passivity, we could say, or potentiality where God 
isn't willing, and then he all of a sudden wills again because 
either something happened in time, in history, or whatever 
else. God is not composed of a faculty 
of will. Lastly, God is not both agent 
and patient. This has probably come up already, 
but Aquinas says we ascribe to God operation by reason of its 
being the ultimate perfection, not by reason of that into which 
operation passes, the thing operated upon. or that which is susceptible 
to operation. And we attribute power to God 
by reason of that which is permanent and is the principle of power, 
and not by reason of that which is made complete by operation. So God cannot be made complete 
by anything. If God was composed of the ability 
to operate and the ability to be operated upon, or if he was 
composed of act as well as this potency which is, the ability 
or capacity to become something different than it is, then we 
would not and we could not consistently say. that God is complete because 
he would have to come or arrive at completion by either the operation 
of himself on himself or by the submission to some reality whereby 
he can be moved by things outside of himself. God didn't become 
complete by creation by moving from being not creator to now 
being creator. So as if creation adds something 
to God but rather God from eternity willed creation and was the creator. So we cannot say or we do not 
speak of God as being one who can be made complete by operation. If we think about his lovingness, 
remember we noted last time that this doctrine of simplicity, 
God without parts, and this doctrine of impassibility, which we'll 
look at next time, does not construe a god who is immobile or is unmoved 
by his creation or anything else like that. And what we mean by 
that is that he is somehow this static and inert god who just 
is up there, the unmoved mover of perhaps a Greek paganism. 
But rather that since he is pure act and since he is wholly the 
operator, he is infinite in his love. He cannot be moved from 
one level or amount of lovingness to a higher amount, and he certainly 
cannot be dropped. to a lower amount in his exercise 
of love towards his people. But rather, in upholding these 
two doctrines, we're setting forth a God who is always as 
loving as he ever will be, since his love is identical to the 
blessedness and the richness of his being and his essence. 
If God was changeable in that way, then he would love you less 
at some point in your life and more at another point. He would 
fluctuate, or he would ebb and flow. with the vicissitudes of 
human sin in the world. He would move at some point from 
this chastising love, where he doesn't love you as much at this 
point. And then you get your act together, and you're no longer 
under chastisement. And now God loves you a little 
bit more. If God was such a passable God, 
then we really couldn't say that he is most loving or that he 
is infinite and absolute in his love. But because he is pure 
act, because there is no passive potency whereby he has the ability 
to be different at one time than he is at another, we can say 
and we can rejoice in a God who is infinite in love and never 
changes in the exercise of his love to us. God does not receive, 
God cannot be impressed upon, and God cannot feel. Remember, 
because our minds say, well, if the Bible says anything, the 
Bible talks about God's dynamic love. It talks about this God 
who is full of feeling and emotion and that sort of thing. And maybe 
we need to qualify and refine our language. But when we say 
feel, don't we always have the underlining assumption and belief 
that that person who is feeling can be changed and acted upon. 
So at one point, they did not have something that is true of 
them at a later point in time. With this doctrine of simplicity, 
we cannot say that God receives, but rather that he is always 
productive. We cannot say that God is impressed 
upon, but as the first mover, that he is the only one who does 
impress upon. And God does not feel. He can 
arouse our feelings. He acts. And we feel, but he 
never moves from a position of having not felt to feeling, but 
rather is wholly pure and active in all of those things that we 
might say are affections in God. The biblical foundations for 
the doctrine of divine simplicity. The doctrine of divine simplicity 
is not plainly revealed in scripture, but is arrived at by rational 
reflection upon a host of biblical data and other mere, clearly 
revealed doctrines about God. chapter 1, paragraph 6. That 
wasn't a quote from that, but that's what we get from paragraph 
6 of our confession. Truths are explicitly set down 
or by good and necessary consequence arrived at. They are necessarily 
contained. So where in the Bible we would look first off at creation 
ex nihilo as a biblical piece of the divine simplicity puzzle. God at creation did not take 
you know, certain things that were already existing alongside 
of him and create the world from that preexistent and eternal 
matter. God does not tinker upon things 
that existed alongside of him in order to form the things of 
this universe. There were not these existing 
principles of love and graciousness and mercifulness and long suffering 
that God took upon himself and participated in at creation, 
but rather he is the sufficient and ontological reason for all 
of those things. Creation, ex nihilo, assumes 
or supports a God who is simple and uncomposed. The doctrine 
presented in Exodus 3, 14, and 15, you can turn there for a 
moment in Exodus 3, 14, and 15. Many of the interpreters, the 
commenters of this particular passage will identify its contribution 
to understanding the vast difference between God and men. It is not 
the case that God can say, or that men can say, I am who I 
am, but rather this is something exclusive that is the exclusive 
rights of Yahweh, the exclusive rights of God. Verse 14 of Exodus 
3, and God said to Moses, I am who I am. And he said, thus you 
shall say to the children of Israel, I am has sent me to you. Moreover, God said to Moses, 
thus you shall say to the children of Israel, the Lord God of your 
fathers, The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God 
of Jacob has sent me to you. This is my name forever, and 
this is my memorial to all generations." The idea here is not that, oh, 
we're to understand this in light of a simple reading of the text, 
but there is the clear reality that man cannot say, I can't 
go to Steve and say, I am who I am. Because I don't gain my 
principle of M-ness by myself, but rather I derive it as a creature 
from God. God grants to me, in his condescending 
and creative love and mercy, the principle of being. But with 
God, He can only say, I am who I am, because he is the principle, 
or he is the ontologically sufficient reason for his own being. God 
is I am who I am. Deuteronomy 6, for God there 
is one in such a way that there can be no other. Remember we 
noted last time, this isn't a Unitarian text in Deuteronomy. 6.4, whereby 
to understand that is in opposition to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
But rather, it is certainly monotheistic. But many theologians have arrived 
at the conclusion that the reason why God can say, or that the 
people of Israel can, in the Shema, say, the Lord our God, 
the Lord is one, is because of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity 
excludes the possibility of the inclusion of other gods in reality, 
because God is uncompounded and not composed, we might say, of 
genus and species. He's not one species of the genus 
deity, but rather being simple. He is the one and only living 
and true God. You can also make a note, Isaiah 
44, 6 and 8. Isaiah 45, 5 to 6. The language, this idea of God 
being identical with his attributes, we see in 1 John 1, 5 and in 
1 John 4, 8. These two things, first off, 
God is light. Secondly, God is love. Remember, 
we have those is's. that predicate things of God. 
God is loving. God is merciful. God is just. But we have those is's that are 
more than predication, but rather is's, we might say, of identicality. They're saying what God is in 
his essence in being. We can't say, you know, I can't 
say Cam is love, because if I am loving, it's in virtue of love, 
not in virtue of myself. But God can say and reveal that 
he is love. because love is identical to 
his very being. God is loving in virtue of God. 
We can note Malachi 3.6 and James 1.17. Malachi 3.6, I am God, 
I do not change. James 1.17, in God there is no 
variation or shadow of turning. If God was not simple, he could 
change. That simple example of act and 
passive potency, if God had potentiality, whereby he had the capacity to 
become something different, then that immediately brings immutability 
off the table, because he could become something that he was 
not prior to becoming. God, there is no becoming in 
God. There is only being. And then Psalm 8, 1 to 4, Psalm 
90, verse 2, and Acts 17, 25 speak to God's independence. God is not dependent upon the 
creature for his knowledge even of those creatures. He's not 
dependent upon anything to become anything that he was not. He 
is independent and his knowledge is independent upon the creature 
and he does not stand in need of his creatures. So just to 
close, and then you can ask any questions, what is at stake in 
a rejection of the doctrine of divine simplicity? First off, 
divine absoluteness, to forfeit the doctrine of divine simplicity 
is to jettison the requisite ontological framework for divine 
absoluteness. That's dolezal. God is absolute. That is, no principle or power 
stands back of God as the explanation for himself, but rather he is 
the sufficient and exclusive explanation for himself. God 
could not be most wise, most loving, most holy, every way 
infinite if he was a compound being. And then, of course, his 
immutability His eternality, His unity, and His independence 
are at stake in the rejection of this doctrine of divine simplicity. Well, let's close in prayer, 
and then we'll have five minutes while Jim is here, and then any 
time afterwards, if you want questions or clarifications, 
there's a lot of words, a lot of phrases, a lot of ideas in 
there that can bounce off my head as well, but please ask, 
and that applies to everybody from the age of two up. Let's 
pray. God, we rejoice in you. We rejoice 
in you as that God who has revealed yourself in the holy scriptures. 
We thank you for what we can therein read of our precious 
God, Father, Son, Holy Spirit. We rejoice in the truth of your 
absolute holiness, your love, your mercy, your graciousness, 
your long-suffering. And we do just pray that you'd 
help us to adequately worship you. We pray that we would not 
manufacture in our fallible minds any false conceptions of God, 
but rather that we might know you, that we might understand 
those things that you've revealed so that we might all the more 
return in worship and that you would be that recipient of honor 
and glory and praise. And we just ask that you go with 
us now into worship where we might rejoice in you Christ whom 
you've sent, and we do pray in his name, amen.